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Abstract
Integrating the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) into supply chain manage-
ment enables flexible and efficient on-demand exchange of goods between
merchants and suppliers. However, realizing a fair and transparent supply
chain system remains a very challenging issue due to the lack of mutual trust
among the suppliers and merchants. Furthermore, the current system often
lacks the ability to transmit trade information to all participants in a timely
manner, which is the most important element in supply chain management for
the effective supply of goods between suppliers and the merchants. This the-
sis presents a blockchain-based supply chain management system in the IIoT.
The proposed system takes advantage of blockchain technology in terms of its
transparency and tamper-proof nature to support fair goods exchange between
merchants and suppliers. Additionally, the decentralization and pseudonymity
property will play a significant role in preserving the privacy of participants in
the blockchain. In particular, fairness in the IIoT is first defined. Then, a design
for a smart contract for fair goods exchange is presented to prevent malicious
behavior through imposing penalties. The proposed system was prototyped on
Ethereum and experiments were conducted to demonstrate its feasibility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Supply chain management systems can coordinate cross-organization processes to move
products from suppliers to merchants. Empowered by the emerging Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT) technology, modern supply chain management promises to provide industri-
al sectors with more efficient on-demand resource management services [35]. In a supply
chain system, merchants and suppliers can dynamically exchange goods, which makes it
increasingly important to enforce a reliable and affordable supply chain management sys-
tem [40]. In particular, the demand for fairness requires merchants and suppliers to correct-
ly follow their contracts and behave honestly [12]. This issue becomes more challenging
when there is a lack of transparency and mutual trust in the current supply chain systems.
According to the statistics [1], concern for ensuring an ethical supply chain has continued
to proliferate since 2018. The emerging blockchain technology is regarded as a promising
solution to the above issue [25] [16] [29]. Blockchain technology currently plays a sig-
nificant role as a foundation for distributed ledgers that can offer an innovative platform
for decentralized and transparent transaction mechanisms in industries [2]. When applied
to a supply chain system, blockchian technology can significantly enhance transparency
and credibility for fair goods exchange. As a result, large corporations and organizations
are moving aggressively towards building a blockchain-based infrastructure while boosting
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mutual trust among industrial entities [16].
However, realizing the promises of such a blockchain based system still faces non-
trivial challenges. Firstly, there is no straightforward solution to designing a smart contract
that preserves fairness. Secondly, the feasibility and implementation of such a system
remains unsolved. This thesis presents a proposal for a fair and efficient supply chain
management system based on blockchain. It allows suppliers and merchants to exchange
goods and prevent malicious behaviors. The contributions of this study can be summarized
as follows:
• To first provide a definition of the fairness requirements for supply chain manage-
ment, followed by extending an existing smart contract for fair digital goods ex-
change [15]. The smart contract is also designed in order to achieve fair goods ex-
change for IIoT-enabled supply chain management.
• By enforcing penalties, our designed smart contract can compel the involved parties
to honestly fulfill their obligations. Moreover, this present work implements the
smart contract on the Ethereum network and experimental results demonstrate the
feasibility of the proposed scheme.
1.2 Motivation
Supply chain management (SCM) is considered as a sequence of main processes that
span many industries on a global level, whereby it is the network that stands between an
organization and its suppliers. These processes involve several phases where data flows
are distributed in different directions, starting from manufacturers through suppliers and
distributors, to customers. This illustrates the major importance of data flow, which can
either support or impact critical business decisions. Although there is high demand for
such a system, traditional centralized supply chain information systems lack many of the
characteristics, such as security, transparency and fairness, that are considered as necessary
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in real-time for many businesses. This thesis provides a conceptual theoretical framework
based on a distributed solution of a private ledger to share data among trading partners
in real-time and with full transparency and fairness. The proposal presented in this work
uses a distributed ledger system that is based on blockchain technology that documents all
exchange custody events related to commerce between parties. This system is considered
under the private and open type of blockchain [5] [18] where these exchanges are distribut-
ed between trading partners by contract only, thereby providing security and privacy for
participants.
1.3 Objectives
The aim of this research is to investigate a new approach to developing and examining a
distributed system that can share trading transactions or information related to supply chain
management in the case of buying and selling between parties while ensuring a commer-
cial fairness protocol. This model depends on blockchain technology that is executed on the
Ethereum framework without any third-party interference, censorship or chance of fraud.
Furthermore, this present work performs a security analysis and conducts experiments to il-
lustrate the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed scheme. Particular emphasis is placed
on the realization of a fairness protocol in the smart contract. The concept of fairness prop-
erty for each side is defined, together with a description of the process needed to achieve
fairness in this scheme.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The comprehensive structure of this thesis takes the form of five chapters, including
this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 begins by laying out the background to blockchain
technology and the supply chain, with a summary of related work in the field. Chapter 3
is concerned with the main proposal of the thesis, which is secure and fair IIoT-enabled
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supply chain management via blockchain-based smart contracts, including the problem
formulation used for this study, and presents the proposed research scheme, focusing on
the system architecture and scheme model. Chapter 4 presents the implementation and
analyzes the results of the data model using the Ethereum of the proposed framework. The
final chapter, which is the conclusion, gives a brief summary with a critique of the findings
and areas for further research in this field are identified.
4
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Blockchain Technology
2.1.1 Concept of Blockchain
A blockchain is an immutable record or ledger which, as a growing chain, contains
many blocks that link together using a cryptographic hash. By way of explanation, simi-
lar to a conventional public ledger, blockchain refers to the arrangement of a sequence of
blocks in which a comprehensive record of a complete list of transactions records is con-
tained [13]. Each block in a chain includes a cryptographic hash that is typically like a point
of the immediately previous block. Transaction data and a timestamp are also included.
Genesis block Block i Block i+1 Block i+2
Hash block i-1
Tx1 Tx2 Txn
Hash block i
Tx1 Tx2 Txn
Hash block i+1
Tx1 Tx2 Txn
Hash block 0
Tx1 Tx2 Txn
Figure 2.1: A sequence of blocks
Connection is made through a hash value that serves as a reference, known as the parent
block [8]. The genesis block has no parent block since it is the first block of a blockchain, as
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shown in Fig. 2.1. Blockchain started from a White Paper published in 2008 by an anony-
mous author using the name Satoshi Nakamoto [36]. The concept consists of a peer-to-peer
version of digital currency that allows cash to be sent directly from one party to another
online party without going through a third party, as is the norm in financial institutions.
The critical concepts of blockchain include group consensus, trustless-ness, immutability,
decentralization, distributed ledgers and security. At the core of blockchain is a ledger,
which can be defined as a record-keeping device that allows keepers of that record to tell a
story in addition to knowing and tracking asset ownership or any type of imaginable data.
Although blockchain is considered as a new and cutting-edge technology, it is in fact a
creative amalgamation of many old concepts of methodologies and technologies. The main
attributes of blockchain include:
• Decentralisation: The validation of each transaction is a crucial element in conven-
tional centralized systems. Unlike the validation performed by central trusted agen-
cies, which often results in bottlenecks of performance and cost, blockchain network
transactions can be achieved between any two peers (P2P), without authentication
from a central agency. The concept results in a significant reduction in equipmen-
t costs in addition to overheads related to the development and operation of those
systems, as well as a decrease in pressure and suffocating performance of the main
server. Furthermore, this mechanized system prevents having a single point of fail-
ure or dependency in the case where, when any node comes back online after being
offline for any reason, it can sync back to the current ledger with other online nodes.
• Persistency: It is almost impossible to tamper with transactions spread across a
network since they must first be verified then recorded in blocks before they are dis-
tributed in the main ledger in the blockchain. Additionally, each transactions spread
is checked while the broadcasted block is validated by other nodes. Thus, it is easy
to detect any falsification.
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• Anonymity: Each user can generate an address useful in interacting with the blockchain
network. Different addresses can also be generated by users in instances where they
want to avoid exposing their identity. In this way, no private user information is kept
with any central entity. Additionally, a certain amount of privacy is preserved on the
blockchain transactions. However, the intrinsic constraint nature of the blockchain
cannot guarantee perfection in privacy preservation.
• Auditability: Validating and recording each blockchain transaction with a time-
stamp makes it easy for users to verify and trace preceding records in the distributed
network by accessing any node. The Bitcoin blockchain provides an iterative mech-
anism through which a transaction can be traced to the previous transaction, thus
enhancing the transparency and traceability of the stored data.
2.1.2 Decentralized Networks and Ledgers
The blockchain ledger uses a peer network for updating and storage. The job of each
node is to maintain its own ledger copy in the network, hence all the nodes come to a
consensus regarding the contents of their updated ledger. This gives a guarantee that each
individual copy of a ledger with nodes in the network is identical, which means that no
centralized ledger is required. Moreover, if one of the nodes goes offline, the network
continues to function seamlessly where the node can synchronize with the most recent
ledger to be updated with the current state in the network. This allows for this technology
to have no single point of failure and is the cause of the considerable interest in blockchain
in parts of the world with developing infrastructures.
2.1.3 Blockchain Architecture
The main components of a block are the header and the body, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The
specific components of a header are [48]:
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• Version: This highlights the specific set of block validation rules to be followed.
• PrevHash: The hash value made up of 256 bits that link the current block to the
previous block.
• Timestamp: The current timestamp as seconds since 1st January 1970 at Time 00:00
UTC.
• nBits: These present the hashing target in a compressed layout.
• Nonce: A field with only 4-byte size that often begins with 0. However, it goes up.
• Merkle tree root: This contains the hash value of all block transactions.
Figure 2.2: Blockchain Architecture
The other main component of the block is the body that is made up of a transaction
counter, which tracks completed transactions. The maximum size limit of block transac-
tions depends on the size of each transaction along with the size of the block. Authen-
tication of transactions in the blockchain is processed using an asymmetric cryptography
mechanism [48] . In the event of an untrustworthy environment, digital signatures based
on asymmetric cryptographies are used.
The current blockchain can be categorized into three types, namely public, private and
consortium, the selection of which often depends on a company’s business [7]. With public
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blockchain, everyone is able to verify and check a transaction as well as participate in the
process of reaching consensus. As an example, Ethereum as a platform [9] and Bitcoin as
an application are both public blockchain. However, in a private blockchain such as Hyper-
ledger [9], the node will be more restricted and has authority management in terms of data
access. For either consortium type, the platform can be open or closed, which means that
the node with authority can be chosen in advance. This kind of blockchain is usually cho-
sen in the case of partnerships, that is between two or more closed companies when they
are considered as partly decentralized, such as the R3CEV Corda Platform [6]. Numer-
ous public blockchains, which emerge on an almost daily basis, attract a multitude of users
since they are open to the world. Many companies implement this blockchain for auditabil-
ity and efficiency. Additionally, there is a consortium blockchain that supports a number
of business applications. Currently, two of the best known platforms are Hyperledger and
Ethereum. Hyperledger creates business consortium blockchain frameworks. The tools
for building this consortium blockchain are provided by Ethereum. A comparison of the
different types of blockchain is provided in Table 2.1.
2.1.4 Consensus Function
The case of the Byzantine Generals problem is helpful in reaching a consensus among
the untrustworthy nodes [28]. In this case, a group of generals, who were tasked with com-
manding some of the Byzantine armies surrounding a city, were told that they must agree
on whether or not to attack the city. Thus, if some of the generals were to attack the city,
the attack would fail. However, among them there could be traitors who might create an
untrustworthy environment by communicating different information to different general-
s, thus making it difficult to reach a consensus. The distributed nature of the blockchain
network poses a similar challenge in terms of distributed nodes. Ledgers in all nodes in
a blockchain must have the the same copy which, since the nodes are not centralized, is
not achievable. Nodes must trust other nodes and this is facilitated by protocols that ensure
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consistency among ledgers in different nodes. To highlights common approaches for reach-
ing a consensus in the blockchain, there are many consensus algorithms mechanisms in a
blockchain, which vary according to their purpose as well as their respective advantages
and disadvantages. However, they all have to agree to the same block that ensures that the
verified block has been correctly added to the chain in the blockchain. Table 2.1 provides
a comparison between different consensus algorithms [42]. The comparison was made ac-
cording to properties provided by [31] in terms of node identity management, which means
that a node could be identified or could anonymously join a network. Energy saving is
also included as some protocols require electricity to process, as is the tolerated power of
the adversary, which refers to the hash power which is considered as the starting point for
taking control of the network. Finally, the table includes some examples of applications or
platforms that use these protocols. Of the many types of blockchain protocols, this present
work focuses on the three that are best known.
Protocols
Node identity
management Energy saving
Tolerated power
of adversary Example
PoW Open No <25% computing power Bitcoin
PoS Open Partial <51% stake Peercoin
PBFT Permissioned Yes <33.3% faulty replicas Hyperledger Fabric
PoA Permissioned Yes authority node only Kovan and Parity
Table 2.1: Consensus protocols comparison
As shown in the above table, both PBFT and PoA are permissioned protocols, which
means that the identity of a node wishing to join consensus must be known to the entire net-
work. As a consequence, this applies more to commercial than public modes. In contrast,
PoS and PoW are more appropriate for public blockchain.
2.1.5 Smart Contract: Ethereum
The smart contract, as one of the Turing-complete programming languages, was first
proposed by Szabo [26]. In 2015, Ethereum introduced a new concept of blockchain 2.0
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platforms by adding the idea of smart contracts that enable developers to add custom rules
and logic to their transactions. This consequently changed the concept of blockchain, rec-
ognizing that it can do more than merely store data. Blockchain has now become a fully-
fledged platform for application development, such that business processes can be automat-
ed and modelled on the one platform, which is the same as that used for their transaction
data Fig 2.3. Enabling smart contracts means that blockchain can be applied to many s-
cenarios [46]. Known as a chain code in some platforms, it can also be described as an
Mining 
Ethereum
Blockchain
Creator
Customer
Customer
Figure 2.3: Smart Contract
electronic contract of a self-executed program with valid inputs of rules, conditions, prece-
dents and decision points into transactions in the blockchain. The smart contract supports
users in making a deposit on the blockchain that they cannot redeem before the unlock
time [8]. This is vital for the proposed payment scheme that is introduced in Chapter 3.
However, it is essentially a type of transaction in a blockchain by which each full node can
verify execution of the process. Smart contracts have many advantages :
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• Autonomy: Anyone can develop contracts, which means that there is no need for
intermediaries such as auditors or lawyers.
• Cost: Dispensing with intermediaries often lowers costs.
• Accuracy: Since human intermediaries are being replaced with executable codes, the
process will ensure the same performance without manipulation.
• Backup: There is a permanent record on the blockchain that allows for traceability
or auditing, even if the author is no longer in business.
In Ethereum Blockchain, there is a concept called Gas, which is simply the amount paid
by users as the cost for a transaction to be validated or processed on the blockchain. It is a
reward separate from the consensus mining reward that is given to all miners independently,
which means that it is a reward for all nodes on the network. Each transaction on the
Ethereum blockchain must be submitted with Gas. However, it is important to understand
that Gas is only consumed when data is written to the network whereas reading consumes
no Gas. The cost of Gas varies from one contract to another as it directly depends on
the type and complexity of the operation; more complex operations will cost more Gas
than those that are simple. Consequently, architects and developers are keen to check their
Gas costs on online Ethereum Gas Stations for an estimate based on the operations under
development.
2.1.6 Security and privacy
From the perspective of security enhancement, the rapid increase in varieties of new
mobile devices and service providers in recent years has highlighted vulnerability issues
regarding malicious nodes. Various anti-malware filters have been offered to isolate ma-
licious files that use the same matching pattern schemes. The detected virus patterns are
stored and updated in a central server. Even so, malicious attackers still take advantage
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of vulnerable centralized countermeasures. BitAV, a novel anti-malware environment, was
proposed by Noyes [37] to help users spread malicious code on blockchain in a bid to en-
hance the security of distributed networks. According to Noyes [37], BitAV can enhance
fault accuracy and scanning speed, which makes the network less vulnerable to directed
denial-of-service attacks. The reliability of security infrastructure can also be improved
using blockchain technologies. As an example, malicious attacks or flaws in hardware and
software components contribute to a single point of failure exhibited in conventional pub-
lic key infrastructures (PKIs). According to [3], a privacy-aware PKI can be constructed
using blockchain while concurrently enhancing the reliability of conventional PKIs. Fur-
thermore, privacy protection where mobile service and social network providers collect
sensitive data about individuals adds to the increased risk with which users’ private data is
exposed to malware. Additionally, storing the information on central servers increases the
susceptibility to malicious attacks. As an illustration, more than 300 petabytes of users’
personal data have been collected by Facebook since it began [41]. Blockchain can en-
hance the privacy of sensitive information through a management system that decentralizes
personal data, thus ensuring user ownership of private data is maintained [49].Some of the
privacy issues that the system protects include data ownership, audibility, transparency and
gained access control.
2.1.6.1 Cryptographic techniques
Each entity in blockchain has a private key used for signing transactions and a public
key that is used for the purpose of accessing the signed digital transactions that are pub-
lished throughout the entire network. The characteristics of a digital signature encompass
two phases, starting with the signing phase then the verification phase. As an example, a
user known as Alice wants to send a transaction to Bob, another user. Alice first needs
to sign on a transaction by generating a hash value that will be from the same transaction
she will send. Next, she will encrypt that hash using her private key. The original data
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contained in the encrypted hash is then sent to Bob. On the other side, Bob will verify the
transaction by comparing the decrypted hash value using the public key owned by Alice
with the hash value obtained from the data received by the hash function similar to Alice’s.
Blockchain will use a digital signature algorithm, which is an elliptic curve algorithm, to
sign their transaction in the P2P network [49]. The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) is considered as one type of digital signature algorithms. There is an approach
by public-key cryptography that depends on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves that
are applied to some limited fields. As a consequence, it requires smaller keys to provide
equivalent security to that of non-EC cryptography.
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Figure 2.4: How transactions are verified and chained together
In a technically simplified example, Figure 2.4 gives a view of how the transaction on
blockchain is signed, then linked together. Assuming that B wants to send bitcoins to C, the
transaction will be hashed and signed with B’s private key and the transaction will contain
the hash of the previous transaction and B’s public key. Anyone in the network can verify
it as authorized by B. In the first place, B’s public key has to match B’s address according
to the previous transaction, which will prove that the public key is valid. Subsequently, B’s
signature on the transaction will be verified by using B’s public key. This phase ensures
that the transaction is authorized and valid by sender B. However, B’s public key is not
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public until the key is used on a previous verification process. From that point, it can be
understood that cryptocurrencies are passed from one address to another via a chain of
transactions. Thus, each phase in the transaction chain can be checked to ensure that the
bitcoins are spent validly.
2.1.6.2 Privacy enhancing techniques
The traditional blockchain technology does not consider privacy. However, it has been
applied to different application scenario, where privacy could be a critical issue. Thus,
privacy has become a critical issue for its widely successful adoption. Next, we introduce
some privacy enhancing techniques to preserve the user anonymity in the blockchain net-
work. Informally, anonymity indicates that the true identity of a user should be concealed
from the public while enjoying the blockchain services. In specific , anonymity can be
defined in two different levels: pseudonym and unlinkability.
Pseudonym and unlinkability
Pseudonym means that users can choose different pseudonyms for different services. A
general method to achieve pseudonym and authenticity at the same time is to use pseudonym-
based certificate. This requires a public key infrastructure (PKI) to manage the certificates
for users. Instead of pseudonym-based certificates, PKI can also adopt pseudonym-based
identity signature for preserving the anonymity of a user. In an identity-based signature,
users can derive public keys from the public identities and thus avoid the communication
and storage overhead of the certificate.
In pseudonym based methods, user activities can be linked together when they use the
same pseudonym across the different services. This is an issue if an attacker has some back-
ground knowledge and could launch de-anonymization attacks. Motivated by this issue,
another concept is one-time unlinkability which means that users can be anonymously au-
thenticated each time and cannot be linked across different sessions. Existing cryptographic
techniques such as group signature and ring signature can achieve this property. In a group
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signature scheme, an issuer can assign group credentials to each group member. A group
member with valid group certificate can prove the membership in a zero-knowledge man-
ner. Due to the randomness introduced in the proof process, the unlinkability is achieved
for different sessions.
Ring Signature
Ring signature is a particular type of digital signature which can provide privacy for
signers who want to prove the authenticity of a message to a verifier without revealing his
identity. It has been widely utilized in cryptocurrency systems such as Monero to ensure
that there is no way for anyone to trace a user only according to his transactions on the
blockchain. Specifically, using ring signature technique, Monero can protect the privacy of
the sender through obscuring the transaction inputs such that no one can identify the actual
signer of the transaction.
Generally, a ring signature is generated by someone in a group and it guarantees that
no matter which group member signs on a message, nobody can determine who the group
member is. Suppose a group of users each of which has a pair of public/private keys, then
any user in the group can generate a ring signature on a message with his private key and
all the public keys in the group. The produced ring signature can be publicly verified by
anyone with the group of public keys. Taking Monero as an example, suppose that a user
A wants to send some Monero coins to user B in order to finish an exchange, the workflow
of a ring signature to ensure the privacy of user A who signs the transaction is briefly
introduced in the following: First, user A chooses some arbitrary non-signers of the ring
signature from past transaction outputs which include their public keys; then user A signs
the transaction with his privacy key and public key together with the non-signers’ public
keys so that it is computationally infeasible for anyone else to identify the actual signer.
Note that although user A’s public is also used in the signature, it could also be used in
other transactions by some others.
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2.2 Supply chain system
Digitizing information and its exchange experienced significant improvement in the last
few decades by undergoing different stages or phases due primarily to technological inno-
vation and demands. Such changes went from theory-based to the secluded application
of several aspects of organizations or their exchange. During this phase, the process was
complex with multiple applications and databases, where each one was served by different
departments or services such as finance, maintenance, human resources or purchasing. Af-
ter this phase, the trend was for organizations to go to a new concept, that is integrating the
various spectrums of the entity under one system, known as enterprise resource planning
(ERP). The ERP system brought a remarkable revolution that merged the digital thread of
numerous services within each institution, taking into account the different emphases of
each business, depending on the organization’s core business. This revolution led to facili-
tation between all business functions within the entity in addition to managing transactions
with their partners. Nevertheless, persistent demand led to globalization of these types of
systems, especially for corporate groups, in an attempt to be more broadly linked with their
corporate partners. Since then, the digital thread has further extended to include organiza-
tions’ external relations which, in turn, facilitates and accelerates the wheel of productivity
for customer relations management systems ”CRMs”. Such advances in facilitation in
communication processes has led to the emergence of the cloud computing model which
allows several entities to exchange data using one common or shared platform. Currently,
these frameworks, which are seamlessly incorporated within the internal processes of an
organization, play a significant role in improvements related to transparency and effciency.
However, with the evolution of technology, demands become increasingly more accurate.
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2.2.1 Digital supply chain (DSC)
The digital supply chain (DSC) has numerous benefits. These include services that are
cost effective and activities that create value with numerous benefits to the many players
in the ecosystem, including suppliers, firms, customers, and employees. A supply chain
is made up of three or more parties: the organization; the flow of products or services,
both downstream and upstream, from sources; and consumers [34]. The concept of sup-
ply chain reinforces the role played by the flow of information between firms, mainly at
activity and business process levels. For efficient integration between players to be real-
izedIn order to realize efficient integration between actors, the supply chain must have its
processes and information integrated. The main characteristic of the DSC is the strategic
and operative information exchange between suppliers which encompasses finance, de-
sign, production, research, and/or competition [11]. The information exchange enhances
communication between the main players in the chain. Generally, inter-organizational co-
ordination is realized through electronic links that connect information systems, making it
possible to automate and digitize the processing of source-to-pay processes in the supply
chain that bring together customers and suppliers. The sharing of information and process-
ing functions in the supply chain is not only limited to the business process level. Rather,
it also encompasses a considerable volume of data from social media applications, devices
and sensors (IoT) [24]. An important component of modern DSCs is the integrated sup-
ply chain information models. These are reinforced by the role of service automation and
information integration, which act as crucial business drivers. According to Santos and
Eisenhardt [23], the main motivation behind the integration of the supply chain is the ef-
ficiency that comes with minimal governance , including the cost of exchange with other
participants in the ecosystem and individuals within the organization in question. Cost sav-
ings realized through information technology make it possible for more information to be
frequently and accurately processed from numerous sources around the globe. When in-
formation flows are properly automated, the need for manual data entry is eliminated , thus
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reducing human error. Even though B2B (Business to Business) [38] integration is widely
known to build supply chain efficiency, the low levels of system interoperability that are
currently experienced result in high costs of investment despite the fact that the probable
benefits have not been achieved. Other advantages DSC include: reduction in the cost of a
product or service: enhanced flexibility in the supply chain design: reduced lead times in
the supply chain: and the creation of a competitive advantage. For information to be con-
sidered as effectively shared, it must bring new value to customers and actors in the supply
chain in terms of services, visibility, prediction, and decision making. The driving factor
is the need to communicate the right information to the right audience at the right time for
the purpose of making decisions. The important role of service integration coupled with
information integration act as crucial drivers of the value of a business in supply chains.
The bundling of information coupled with systemic integration are additional value drivers
that create extra value for customers. Currently, attention is being paid to examining value
creation from big data in supply network environments that embrace industrial B2B. The
focus is also on the inter-organizational integration founded on blockchain technology in
the present day economy. The running of supply chains and similar business models may
be broadened significantly through innovative information exchange services. For instance,
according to Kagermann et al [22], an industry environment is made up of manufacturing
systems that are vertically connected to business networks within businesses and factories.
Additionally, the processes are connected horizontally to value networks that are disperse
in nature manageable in real time. New systemic value elements are introduced through
the solid integration of information for public and industrial service users as well as service
providers. The focus of transactional supply chain business processes is the development
of digital ecosystems which results in numerous business opportunities for the players in
the ecosystem. Previous research on the integration of the systemic global supply chain
highlighted four requirements for digital business ecosystems. These are the basis for de-
veloping business as well as innovation and the present research.
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The purpose of the present research is to solve the problem of having a fair goods
exchange under a trusted party between merchant and supplier that may suffer from the
weakness of single point failure. There exist repudiation attacks that lead to unfair solution
evaluation. With the advancement of blockchain technology, research has been conducted
to ensure fair data exchange without any third party. Buyers can share their data only
after they receive rewards while sellers pay only after they obtain the data. Researchers
have commonly adopted the Hashed Timelock contract to make users less likely to behave
maliciously. Further research studies have been conducted on fair computation among
multiple users [4]. For many years, fair exchange has been extensively studied in order
to find a solution to this problem. At the same time, it has been proved or otherwise
assumed that fairness in exchange can be achieved without having a Trusted Third Party
(TTP) [17, 30, 45]. Others tried to circumvent this impossibility by studying weaknesses
on the security models, where the use of a trusted third party can be eliminated only in
the case of the failure of either party to abide by the prior commitment agreed upon or
if departing from the expected behaviour [10]. Some researchers have studied how the
blockchain, or specifically the smart contract, will be a solution where it can take the role
of the TTP [25, 33]. The cut-and-choose protocol [10], which is based on investigating
the garbled circuits that are exchanged between two parties, is able to expose cheater or
misbehaving party. However, it will incur much communication overhead for a blockchain
network, which is a p2p network. Setting a smart contract based on that protocol will
be high in terms of Gas cost [27]. From another perspective, protocol in [15] has been
proposed to achieve fair exchange of digital goods. It has achieved a paradigm shift in a
negligible error rate and small costs.
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Chapter 3
Secure and Fair IIoT-Enabled Supply
Chain Management via
Blockchain-based Smart Contracts
3.1 Problem formulation
The focus of this study is a system that enables flexible and efficient on-demand ex-
change of goods between merchants and suppliers and that specifically addresses the lack
of mutual trust between entities, which is one of the major challenges in blockchain tech-
nology. In order to respond to this challenge, this present work proposes a fair and transpar-
ent supply chain system. This chapter presents the system model, followed by a discussion
of the Threat model and design goals.
3.1.1 System model
In the proposed system model, three main entities are involved, as shown in Fig. 3.1.
Each entity complements the other and has a specific, clear role. These entities and their
roles are described as follows:
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• The Merchant: Uniquely identified by M, the merchant requires specific goods, and
sends an order to the supplier through the blockchain.
• The Supplier: Uniquely identified by S, the supplier posts the goods on the blockchain,
receives the order from M, and then delivers the goods to M.
• Blockchain: The blockchain is the underlying decentralized P2P network. It runs
smart contracts and acts as an external judge between the two parties to effectively
complete the exchange of goods.
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Digital Signature
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Figure 3.1: System Model
In supply chain management, the most important concept is that of fairness. If someone
provides a service, the other party must accommodate by responding, and vice versa. At
a high level, the process of fair goods exchange in this proposed system works as follows:
Supplier S first sets an item list that designates the goods that Merchant M can order. M
then places the order. Subsequently, S processes the order and asks for confirmation from
M, who will check the goods information and send an acceptance notification to the smart
contract. In the next step, the smart contract will create a tag used for labelling the goods,
and publish it so that S can attach it to the goods. S then delivers the goods to M, who
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scans the tag after checking the goods, and then submits it to the smart contract. The
smart contract in blockchain takes the role of an external judge based on the information
collected to determine whether if the contract is correctly fulfilled or to enforce penalties
to the misbehaving parties.
3.1.2 Threat model
The goal of the proposed system is to realize a fair goods exchange between the two
entities, Supplier and Merchant, who could be malicious or untrusted. In particular, the
threat model can be summarized as follows:
• Security against selfish/malicious suppliers: The suppliers could be selfish or ma-
licious users who may not send the goods on time. Moreover, a malicious supplier
can also send different goods other than those agreed in the contract.
• Security against selfish/malicious merchants: The merchants could also be selfish
or malicious. They may not submit the scan or send the signature to the smart contract
after receiving the goods. It is also possible for merchants to reject the goods and
argue that they are not what was requested, which will cost the supplier to lose the
deposit on the smart contract.
3.1.3 Design goals
The design goals mainly contain three aspects:
• Fairness: Our protocol guarantees fairness by relying on smart contracts between
suppliers and merchants over decentralized cryptocurrency. An honest supplier must
ensure that the merchant will pay after receiving the goods and an honest merchant is
assured that he only pays if the supplier delivers the goods ordered by the merchant.
In cases of disagreement, in the proposed system, the contract takes the role of a
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judge. In other words, the smart contract goes beyond a traditional contract that
represents an agreement between the supplier and merchant, and also acts as a judge
to resolve disputes between the supplier and merchant.
• Transparency: One of the benefits provided by the proposed protocol is that it en-
hances the demand for transparency, ensuring that the transaction process is trans-
parent and immutable to both parties.
• Proof-of-concept implementation: Implementation of a fair goods exchange smart
contract between two nodes is presented and explained in detail in Chapter 4, which
also demonstrates the functionality of the proposed scheme. In addition, results in
terms of the cost of gas that will be paid to process each phase in our smart contract in
the blockchain, as well as transaction confirmation time, are analyzed and simulated.
3.2 Proposed Scheme
3.2.1 The System architecture
This subsection provides an overview of the system architecture considered in this
work. In completing an exchange, or in cases of disagreement, the smart contract take
the role of an external judge between two entities. It is assumed that Supplier publishes a
stock information of the goods into the blockchain. Thus, both parties start by registering
themselves as smart nodes. As shown in Fig. 3.2 , Merchant M will place the order that
contains all the information about the goods he wants, in addition to certain conditions such
as the delivery deadline, which will be addressed in detail in Section 3.2.2.4. S will then re-
spond with approval after confirming the availability of the goods through the blockchain;
this is considered as the third stage in the process.
The smart contract will generate the tags which contain the goods information and
the deadline for the delivery, as previously agreed upon by the parties. The tags will be
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Figure 3.2: System Architecture
available for both entities on the smart contract. Thereafter, Suppliers will print the tags
and add them to the goods. The goods are sent in the sixth stage with the use of RFID
[19, 47], which will enable both parties to track shipments of the goods from the smart
contract. When the goods arrive at Merchant’s place, M will scan the tags on the goods after
inspecting them. This indicates that M confirms acceptance on the goods after confirmation
of the smart contract of the validity of the tags and the delivery time. Finally, M is given
the goods and signs for them. The smart contract will then be notified that the goods have
been successfully delivered, and Suppliers will retrieve the deposit in the smart contract.
3.2.2 The Scheme
This section provides the details of the smart contract construction, which assumes that
secure channels [43, 44] have been established between all entities. For example, SSL
(Secure Sockets Layer) can be used to establish a secure channel between two entities [32].
In the proposed scheme, as shown in Fig. 3.3, there are five phases, each of which is based
on the previous phase, with the exception of the first phase. All notations are explained in
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Figure 3.3: Outline of fair goods exchange
Table 3.1.
3.2.2.1 Initialize Phase
Both M and S will register their addresses and public keys to the smart contract as
shown in the algorithm 1. More information can be added, including pkm, addrM , where
pkm is the public key and addrM is M’s address on the smart contract. For his part, S will
register pks, addrS where pks is the public key and addrS is S’s address. In the blockchain,
every account is described by a pair of keys, namely a public/private ECDSA keypair. User
address is obtained from the last 20 bytes of their public key, so it become a 160-bit of
hash. Using private-key cryptography is to ”sign” data then the other side will verify that
the signature is valid by using the public key of the sender to achieve integrity of the data.
26
Notation Explanation
addrM The Merchant’s address
addrS The Supplier’s address
Signmk Signature of Message m signed by k. Messages include Mm=Order Phase,
Ms=Confirmation Phase,Mg=Judgement OK ,MCm=Judgement complain M,
MCs=Judgement complain S )
pkm Merchant’s public key
pks Supplier’s public key
sk1 Merchant’s private key
sk2 Supplier’s private key
Tˆ Item
α A variable between 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, that determines the ratio of P that each of M
and S will deposit
P The price
bD Merchant’s deposit
oD The order date
η The number of Tˆ
σm Signed message
dL Delivery deadline
v, r, s r and s are outputs of an ECDSA signature, and v is the recovery id
cD Confirmed date
sD Supplier’s deposit
Zˆ Tags
dD Delivery Date
T1 Time refers to interval between confirmation and delivery
T2 Time refers to the time limit for participators including, M and S to upload
evidence (proof of misbehavior)
Table 3.1: Notation explanation
3.2.2.2 Order Phase
M will place the order Mm and send it to S after signing the message with his secret
key sk1 for authentication where it will be verified by miners on the blockchain by his pkm.
The format of the order Mm is shown below:
Mm = (Tˆ‖α‖P‖bD‖oD‖η‖dL)
where Tˆ represents the low stock threshold for an item, which is used to determine
whether an order should be placed according to the current stock of the item, i.e., lower
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Algorithm 1: Initialize Phase
1 function Initialization pkm, addrMpks, addrS;
2 M public key = M public key;
3 S public key = S public key;
4 M Address = M Address;
5 S Address = S Address;
than Tˆ , α represents a variable ranging from 0 to 1 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) and determines the ratio
of price P that M and S will deposit, oD refers to the order date, η includes the amount
of goods required by M, and dL represents the delivery deadline. M deposits bD after
calculating the αp with η. It should be noted that α is used to ensure that M will honor the
order and prevent M from dishonestly cancelling the order.
Algorithm 2: Order Phase
1 function OrderPhase (Tˆ , η, σMm , dL, addrM , α, P, v, r, s, depositAccount);
2 . check the identification of Merchant;
3 require(msg.sender == addrM )
. check the signature of Merchant;
4 require(verifySignature(addrM ,σMm , v, r, s))
. add new order;
5 newOrder← {Tˆ , now, η, dL}
memory orderList[i++]← newOrder
. calculate the price ;
6 Total P←η ∗ Tˆ .P
. check the balance of the account;
7 require(msg.value >= totalPrice * (p + α/100))
. Merchant Deposit ;
8 depositAccount += amt
. Phase status ;
9 newOrder.status←Initialized
Then, M will send the signed order to S after checking his Tˆ threshold. The smart
contract checks the identification of Merchant addrM and then adds a new order in the
order list which contains Tˆ , oD, η, P and dL as input. As shown in the algorithm 2, the
smart contract will calculate the total price of the goods by P * η. M will send the bD to
the smart contract address. The entire message Mm will be signed by sk1 using (v, r, s),
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where r and s are outputs of an ECDSA signature, and v is the recovery id [21], and the
resulting signature is SignMmsk1 .
3.2.2.3 Confirmation Phase
In this phase, S will confirm the order based on the availability of the product that
he has already been presented on the public blockchain, including the cD which is the
confirmation day, the Tˆ which is the item that he will finally deliver. For authentication
purposes, S will sign the message with his secret key sk2, where it will be verified by
miners on the blockchain by his pks.
Algorithm 3: Confirmation Phase
1 function ConfirmationPhase (Tˆ , i, σMs , addrS , cD, v, r, s, η, α, depositAccount);
2 . check the identification of Supplier ;
3 require(msg.sender == addrS )
. check the signature of Supplier;
4 require(verifySignature(addrS,σMs , v, r, s))
. Read the latest item from the order list ;
5 memory latestOrder← orderList[i]
latestOrder.cD← now
. check the deposit;
6 totalDeposit← η * p *(α/100)
require(msg.value > totalDeposit)
. Supplier Deposit ;
7 depositAccount += amt
. Phase status ;
8 newOrder.status←Confirmed
The second phase is called the confirmation phase, where S will confirm the order, then
M can start delivering the goods. This phase begins with checking the identification of S
addrS and then checking if M has given the deposit based on P * η and α of the deposit to
prevent unexpected and dishonest cancellation of the order. Ms will then be signed for the
signature Signmssk2 by sk2. At that point, the status of the contract will be confirmed, as is
shown in Algorithm 3.
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3.2.2.4 Delivery Phase
This phase contains offline and online processes that start with generating the Z˘ on
the smart contract for goods that S will deliver. The Z˘ will contain Tˆ and dD, which
is the delivery date. The smart contact will generate Z˘ after S confirmed the order in
the confirmation phase as is shown in Algorithm 4. In the final stage, tags will then be
published to both parties and will be available through the smart contract. Afterwards,
S processes the goods for delivery after labelling them. In the delivery phase, the smart
contract will generate Z˘ based on the information that is given in the order and confirmation
phases Z˘=(Tˆ ,dD). Having been generated, the tags will be available for both sides. At this
point, S will use these tags, add them to the goods and deliver the goods to M.
Algorithm 4: Delivery
1 function GenerateTags;
Input : Tˆ ,dD
Output: Zˆ
2 Order memory← orderList[index];
3 . Generate tag
tagsA← keccak256 (abi.encodePacked(Tˆ ,dD));
4 return tagsA ;
3.2.2.5 Judgement Phase
This phase has two paths to either satisfy both parties, which means (ok) as shown
in Algorithm 5, or not satisfy, which means (complaint), as shown in Algorithm 6. In a
satisfying path as presented in Algorithm 5, M will scan the tags Z˘, and miners will verify
the SignMgsk1 by using pkm. After the scan, the smart contract will check the time of the
delivery by checking the deadline that should be agreed by both sides in the previous phase
according to (dD, T1,T2). If condition now > (dD+T1 +T2) is met. S will then withdraw
η ∗ P ∗ (1 + 2 · α/100), which means that S will receive the two deposits and the status
phase becomes Complete.
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Algorithm 5: Judgement (OK)
1 function AcceptOrder(T1, addrM , cD, σMg , v, r, s, depositAccount);
2 . check the idetification of Merchant
require(msg.sender == addrM );
3 . check the signature of Merchant
require(verifySignature(addrM ,σMg , v, r, s));
4 . check the balance of the account
require((now - cD) < T1));
5 function OrderPayment (dD, T1, T2, addrM , addrS , η, P, α);
6 require(now > dD + T1 + T2);
7 require(msg.sender == addrM );
8 . withdraw(unit256 amount, unit256 depositAccount, address receiver):
withdraw the deposit amount from the contract
account depositAccount to the address receiver;
9 withdraw(η * P * ( α /100)), depositAccount, addrM );
10 require(msg.sender == addrS);
11 withdraw(η * P * (1 + α /100)), depositAccount, addrS);
12 . Phase status
newOrder.status←Completed;
Algorithm 6: Judgement (Complaint)
1 function proofOfComplaint(addrM , addrS , evidence, dD, T1, T2, MCs , α, P, MCm ,
v, r, s);
2 require(now > dD+T1 AND now < dD+T1+T2 );
3 require(verifySignature(msg.sender σMCs , v, r, s));
4 require(verifySignature(msg.sender σMCm , v, r, s));
5 require(msg.sender == addrM );
6 . If the evidence comes from merchant, he can take both the deposit
withdraw(η * P * (1 + 2 ∗ α /100)), depositAccount, addrM );
7 require(msg.sender == addrS);
8 . If the evidence comes from supplier, he can tak both the deposit
withdraw(η * P * (2 ∗ α /100)), depositAccount, addrS);
9 return;
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As previously mentioned, T2 is the period specified prior to the expiration of the a-
greement which allows either party to provide proof of complaint as shown in Algorith-
m 6. The function proofOfComplaint will first check the timeline which requires that
now > (dD + T1) and now < (dD + T1 + T2). Both sides can provide evidence, e.g.,
pictures or tracing records of the goods. In the case that one side provides clear evidence be-
fore the time limit is expired, judiciary is made in the smart contract based on the provided
evidence. Particularly, if M provides the evidence to complain that S has the inappropriate
behaviors, then M can take both deposits and the money of goods back. Otherwise, S can
take both deposits by providing valid evidence. In addition, the case of neither party ob-
jecting to any initiative or confirmation of the receipt within the timeline, the amount will
be transferred from the smart contract account and returned separately to both parties.
3.3 Security analysis
This subsection provides an analysis of the security of the proposed scheme by provid-
ing an intuition on why neither party can break the fairness property. As mentioned in the
previous section, the Judgement phase is the payout phase which is the last round where
both entities can be satisfied. The contract is terminated to enable the supplier to receive
a full deposit or punish the misbehaving parties. If no one can provide a valid evidence
before T2, then the deposit will be sent back to each party. This is the point at which the
smart contract acts as the role of judgement in the case of disagreement to complete the
contract in a fair way. The transaction processes and status in all phases are transparent and
immutable for both parties. As a result, traceability in the proposed exchange protocol is
also achieved through the provision of the smart contract that allows both entities to trace
the transactions and contract states that are reached.
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Chapter 4
Experiment Results
4.1 Experiment setup framework
 
Figure 4.1: Structure of the Parity Ethereum Client
As proof of concept, it is important to implement a working prototype of the proposed
system. Considering that it is the lightest and fastest Ethereum client, using Parity as the
test platform is a good choice [14]. This platform, written in a programming language
called Rust, provides improved performance, code clarity and reliability. Parity Ethereum
Client v2.0 comes with options of building on different operating systems. The JSON-
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RPC HTTP and Web-Sockets server on this platform run by default on port 8545 and
8546. Parity, which is an alternative to Gath, the official Ethereum Client, has many more
features and is more quickly able to build the decentralized application that is needed to
connect to the Ethereum blockchain. In addition to supporting several APIs,* it is fully
configurable [14]. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the client connects to the blockchain by using the
web3 interface. The simulate of the proposed system was implemented on a laptop with
2.40 GHz Intel Core i5 processors and 8 GB memory on Ubuntu Linux Operating System.
The next section is the steps of building Parity Ethereum Client.
4.1.1 Building a Parity Ethereum Client
1. After login as root, use the following command to download the Parity binary from
the server.
bash <(curl https://get.parity.io -L)
2. Build the essential tools for Ubuntu. These are mainly compilers and libraries that
will help to build the Web3 client and node.js. Update the package manager.
apt-get update
3. Build essentials by following commands that will ask a question about the perfor-
mance. Give permission to continue.
apt-get install build-essential
4. Install Node.js from the official web site:
https : //github.com/nodesource/distributions/blob/master/README.md
Now download the package from Alternatively, forNode.js10
$curl -sL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_10.x
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$sudo -E bash -$
5. Update everything once again, then access all the library needed for Node.js. Install
Node.js.
$sudo apt-get
$sudo install -y nodejs$
6. Install the Web3 JavaScript library by first installing npm, then web3, in order to
connect to the Parity client.
npm install web3
When all the installation processes are positively finished, the technical tests can start by
following the next section.
4.1.1.1 Technical Tests
1. In order to check the connection of the Parity client with the official public parity
network, parity runs in the terminal. As shown in Fig. 4.2, this starts by syncing
with the main Ethereum official public blockchain.
Figure 4.2: Connecting with the official public blockchain
2. Connect the local Partiy with web3, as shown in Fig. 4.3, which opens a new terminal
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while keeping the Parity public blockchain terminal running. This is followed by
login as root and runningNode.js by the node, then issuing the following command:
> var Web3 = require(’web3’); // load up web3
undefined
> var web3 = new Web3(); // To create new client instance
undefined
> web3.setProvider(new
Web3.providers.HttpProvider(’http://localhost:8545’)); //
To connect to the localhost parity client
true
> web3.eth.isSyncing(function(err,sync) {
... console.log(sync);
... }); //Syncing will provide data that shows that:
Figure 4.3: Connected with web3
It can be observed that, on the main Ethereum blockchain, if they are not connected,
the blocks highlighted in Fig 4.3 will show up as undefined.
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4.1.2 Building Proof-of-Authority Chains
Proof of Authority (PoA) is supported by Parity with consensus power to be used with
Ethereum Virtual Machine based chains. PoA is a new type of consensus function on
blockchain that can be useful for a private chain. PoA does not solve an arbitrarily diffi-
cult algorithm that depends on random nodes, but instead uses a group of authority nodes
that are apparently able to solve the algorithm, then creates a new secure block in the
blockchain. The chain in PoA must be signed off and approved by most of the authorities
to become a part of the permanent record. This makes it easy to check and maintain the pri-
vate chain that keeps the block issuers accountable. In this experiment, multiple accounts
are created; one is a user account, and two are authorities. Each authority account will
usually only run in a single mode. However, all accounts here are run in the same node.
1. Starting with configuration, create the config file (config.toml) with the following
fields and post it in path /.local/share/io.parity.ethereum/config.toml
[parity]
chain = "/root/demo-spec.json " //the path of json file in
the computer
[account]
pwds = ["/root/node.pwds "] ////the path of the node
passwords file in your computer
[mining]
engine_signer = "0x37f93cfe411fa244b87ff257085ee360fca245e8"
reseal_on_txs = "none" // automatic authorities reseal
2. Create a demo− spec.json, which contains the basic chain required fields as shown
in Fig. 4.4, and save it under demo−spec.json in /root/ or the same path that added
it to the config file.
3. Start to set up the two nodes. Before setup, it must be understood that Parity uses
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Figure 4.4: Chain configuration
a separate folder to store accounts, thus each chain has a different genesis hash. In
order to create the accounts in each chain, the − − chain option must first be run.
Since the two nodes are built and run on separate machines, in order to avoid any
possible collisions, some additional parameters are added before starting Parity, as
can be seen in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Resolving the chain
4. Create a configuration file for each node and post it in the same json file demo −
spec.json path which is in the root:
• Config Node 0 as follows and store under node0.toml:
• Config Node 1 as follows and store under node1.toml:
5. Create one user account and two authorities by using curl.
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Figure 4.6: configure Node 0
Figure 4.7: configure Node 1
• Run the node 0 by parity –config node0.toml and it will return an address.
Authority address 1
curl data ’{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"parity_newAccountFromPhrase",
"params":["node0", "node0"],
"id":0
}’ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X
POST localhost:8540
Figure 4.8: Authority address 1
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User address
curl --data’{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"parity_newAccountFromPhrase",
"params":["user", "user"],
"id":0
}’ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X
POST localhost:8540
Figure 4.9: User address
• Run the node 1 by parity –config node1.toml and it will return an address.
Authority address 2
curl --data ’{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"parity_newAccountFromPhrase",
"params":["node1", "node1"],
"id":0
}’ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST
localhost:8541
Figure 4.10: Authority address 2
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6. Return to point 2 , which is the json file, and file the chain specification.
Figure 4.11: Filed chain
7. Create a file which has the node passwords node.pwds in the same path. This is a
simple file where each line contains an authority account password.
8. Return to point 4 to complete the config node file for each node.
• engine-signer to node0.toml, as seen in Fig. 4.12.
Figure 4.12: Completed file Node 0
• engine-signer to node1.toml , as seen in Fig. 4.13.
9. Run local nodes:
• Node0 by : parity –config node0.toml
• Node1 by: parity –config node1.toml
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Figure 4.13: Completed file Node 1
Figure 4.14: Run node0
Figure 4.15: Run node1
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4.1.2.1 Technical Tests
1. Connect the nodes by using curl, then keep the two terminal nodes open and use a
new terminal with this command:
curl --data ’{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"parity_enode",
"params":[],"id":0
}’ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST
localhost:8540
The result is enode://24829e7ac2505b63256dbbfcc a5e041d84834e9d30c083869fb20da389b
1e3d36d5096a503b9296b785eba5c2a57dc 6af81b8bbb3d601cb72dbe7624e8ea7347
@192.168.56.103:30300 . Now add the result from node 0 to node 1 in the following
command:
curl --data’{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"parity_addReservedPeer",
"params":["Add here the result"]
,"id":0
}’ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST
localhost:8541
so it will be :
curl --data ’{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"parity_addReservedPeer",
"params":["enode://24829e7ac2505b63256dbbfcc
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a5e041d84834e9d30c083869fb20da389
b1e3d36d5096a503b9296b785eba5c2a57
dc6af81b8bbb3d601cb72dbe7624e8ea7347
@192.168.56.103:30300"],
"id":0
}’-H "Content-Type: application/json"
-X POST
localhost:8541
As shown in Fig. 4.16, the nodes should indicate from 0/25 to 1/25 peers in the
terminal in which both of the nodes are connected.
Figure 4.16: Nodes are connected
4.1.3 Smart contract
After building the environment, the smart contract is written with 167 lines of Solidity
code, which is available in Appendix A in Remix Solidity IDE. Solidity language is consid-
ered as an object-oriented programming language, which it can be used on any blockchain
platform. Furthermore, Remix Solidity IDE is a web browser based IDE that is known
as Browser Solidity which allows developers to write and check the functionality of their
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smart contracts before deploying and running the code.
4.2 Performance evaluation
This section provides the results of testing the proposed system in two environments,
namely the private PoA built for this present work and a public PoA. The proposed smart
contract is tested on a public PoA in order to measure the performance of phases on a public
network with more than two nodes.
4.2.1 Private network
Section 4.1 described the setup of the testing environment, namely the Ethereum Parity
Proof of Authority blockchain network, which consists of the two Parity nodes that are the
focus of this test of the exchange between nodes. These are in addition to four accounts,
of which two are authority accounts selected as slot leaders to validate transactions and
issue blocks and two are user accounts, which serve as Merchant and Supplier, to make fair
exchange transactions to the blockchain. Hence, the presented experiments contain some
authority nodes and user nodes to deploy the proposed smart contract.
Cost estimates of the block gas limit are simulated or tested in each phase of the pro-
posed smart contract on the testing network, allowing the cost of a transaction that will be
validated or processed on the real system to be known. More complex operating of the
proposed code will cost more gas. The currency used is Gwei, which is =118.49 Ether. At
the time of writing, 1 Ether =118.49 USD.
4.2.2 Public network
The primary objective of the proposed scheme is to devise a fair supply chain sys-
tem. Implementation of a software prototype was conducted on Ethereum test network.
The supply process was depicted by the smart contract. In the experiments, Solidity was
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Figure 4.18: Transaction confirmation time in Rinkeby
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used to develop smart contracts. The smart contract is saved as Ethereum Vtirual Machine
(EVM) Bytecode in the blockchain. Once a contract gets stored in the blockchain, it has
a unique address so all the participating parties can interact with it using this contract ad-
dress. JavaScript and JAVA programming language were used in developing the primary
logic function in the middle layer. The implementation was performed on the Rinkeby [20],
which is part of the official Ethereum public test network. The daily number of transac-
tions is approximately 60,000 more than 10,000 smart contracts are currently deployed to
Rinkeby. It is a “Proof-of-Authority” network, meaning that signing of the blocks is done
by well-known and trusted members of the community [39]. This process prevents any
attacker from hijacking the mining power within the network. In order to compare the
performances given different numbers of mining nodes and transactions, this current study
repeated experiments in Rinkeby for 10 times, which focuses mainly on two issues: aspects
of network latency as well as synchronous messages in the blockchain. The first issue refers
to the time of transaction confirmation, including sending and conformation of the order as
well as the judge phase. The purpose is to verify whether the transactions on the supply
chain are in synchrony within the entire network and also within a time that is acceptable.
The mean block time taken during the mining in Rinkeby is around 15 seconds. These
experiments comprised 10 transactions that each of them was mined into a single block.
The assigned block numbers range from a value of 2,267,171 to 2,271,710. The mean gas
usage for each of the transactions is around 300,000. As displayed in Fig, the mean time
taken for transaction confirmation on sending and conforming an order is between 6 to 33
seconds. Each of the transactions is confirmed within around 2 block time. With regard to
the low or high points in Fig 4.18, location of the special block is determined and positive
correlation between the time of transaction confirmation and the number of transactions
within a single block is identified. As an example, there is an apparent high point in the
first experiments for phase 2 and the presence of 11 transactions is discovered in the same
block. This number is far higher compared with the mean transactions in the same block.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Works
5.1 Summary of research
In presenting a fully complete system that utilizes blockchain for the supply chain, the
presented work begins with a discussion of issues and methods in general supply chain
management that have been in existence over the last decade, while focusing on the lack
of fairness that can occur between all involved parties. This overview is followed by an
introduction to a blockchain-based supply chain management system for IIoT that consid-
ers how the features of this technology can fill the gaps in the existing system. Specific
emphasis is placed on the realization of a fairness protocol in the smart contract. As a
consequence, fairness property for each side is defined and a process for how to achieve
fairness in the proposed scheme is described. Furthermore, security analysis and experi-
ments are conducted as part of this work in order to illustrate the feasibility and efficiency
of the proposed cheme.
5.2 Future research directions
Addressing the issues that concern all involved parties in the field of supply chain man-
agement offers further potential for future research. In particular, investigating the tracking
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of goods by satellite, especially for global trade, would be valuable in cases of dispute, and
would help to more widely achieve the concept of transparency.
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Appendix A
Codes
Listing A.1: Solidity language
pragma solidity ˆ0.4.0;
// This contract is to realize the fairness goods exchange
between seller and buyer.
contract IIoTChain {
address public buyer;
address public seller;
// alpha
uint public radio;
// this time refers to interval between confirmation and
delivery
uint public T1;
// this time refers to the entity to upload evidence (proof of
misbehavior)
uint public T2;
mapping(address => uint) accountBalance;
mapping(address => uint) accountDeposit;
mapping(string => Item) itemsList;
Order[] orderList;
uint256 index = 0;
// this struct is used to describe the product
struct Item {
string name;
uint price;
50
bool isAvailable;
}
struct Order {
Item item;
uint orderDate;
uint number;
uint deliveryDate;
uint confirmedDate;
uint deadline;
Status status;
}
enum Status {
initialized, // 0
Confirmed, // 1
Accepted, // 2
Completed //
}
function addItem(string _name, uint _price) public {
//only seller can add item list
require(msg.sender == seller);
itemsList[_name].name = _name;
itemsList[_name].price = _price;
itemsList[_name].isAvailable = true;
}
function setItemOrderStatus(string _name,bool _isAvailable)
public {
//only seller can add item list
require(msg.sender == seller);
itemsList[_name].isAvailable = _isAvailable;
}
// this function is used for initialization
function IIoTChain(uint _T1, uint _T2, uint _radio, address
_buyer, address _seller) public {
T1 = _T1;
T2 = _T2;
radio = _radio;
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buyer = _buyer;
seller = _seller;
}
//this function is for buyer to make the order
function orderPhase(string _itemName, uint number, bytes32
orderSignature, uint _deadline, uint8 v, bytes32 r,
bytes32 s)
public payable {
//check the idetification of buyer
require(msg.sender == buyer);
if(itemsList[_itemName].isAvailable == false) return;
//check the signature of buyer
require(isSigned(buyer,orderSignature,v,r,s));
Order memory newOrder = orderList[index++];
newOrder.item = itemsList[_itemName];
newOrder.orderDate = now;
newOrder.number = number;
newOrder.deadline = _deadline;
newOrder.status = Status.initialized;
uint totalPrice = number * itemsList[_itemName].price;
//check the balance of the account
require(msg.value >= totalPrice * (1 + radio/100));
// buyerDeposit
setDeposit(totalPrice * (1 + radio/100));
}
function orderConfirmPhase(string _prodectName, uint256
_index, bytes32 confirmSignature,uint8 v, bytes32 r,
bytes32 s) public
payable {
//check the idetification of seller
require(msg.sender == seller);
//check the signature of buyer
require(isSigned(seller,confirmSignature,v,r,s));
//Items storage itemsTmp;
Order memory order = orderList[_index];
order.confirmedDate = now;
//check the deposit
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uint totalDeposit = order.number *
itemsList[_prodectName].price * (radio/100);
require(msg.value > totalDeposit);
// sellerDeposit
setDeposit(totalDeposit);
order.status = Status.Confirmed;
}
function generateTags(uint256 _index) public returns (string
tags) {
Order memory order = orderList[_index];
string memory tagsA = strConcat(order.item.name, new
string(order.deliveryDate));
return tagsA;
}
function acceptOrderPhase(string _prodectName, uint256 _index,
bytes32 acceptSignature,uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
public
payable {
//check the idetification of seller
require(msg.sender == buyer);
//check the signature of buyer
require(isSigned(buyer,acceptSignature,v,r,s));
//check the balance of the account
require((now - orderList[_index].confirmedDate) < T1);
orderList[_index].status = Status.Accepted;
}
function evidenceGenerate(uint256 _index, string evidence,
bytes32 evidenceSignature,uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
public {
Order memory order = orderList[_index];
require(now > (order.deliveryDate + T1) && now <
(order.deliveryDate + T1 + T2));
require(isSigned(msg.sender,evidenceSignature,v,r,s));
if(msg.sender == buyer){
withdraw(order.number * order.item.price * (1 +
radio/100));
seller.transfer(order.item.price * (radio/100));
} else if (msg.sender == seller) {
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withdraw(order.number * order.item.price * (1+
radio/100));
buyer.transfer(order.item.price * (radio/100));
} else {
return;
}
}
// this function is to do the payment
function orderPaymentPhase(uint256 _index) public
payable {
Order memory order = orderList[_index];
require(now > (order.deliveryDate + T1 + T2));
//proof of misbehavior function by a seller;
if(msg.sender == buyer){
withdraw(order.number * order.item.price * (radio/100));
} else if (msg.sender == seller) {
withdraw(order.number * order.item.price * (1+
radio/100));
} else {
return;
}
order.status = Status.Completed;
}
//this function is for each entity to make a deposit
function setDeposit(uint amt)
{
accountDeposit[msg.sender] += amt;
}
function withdraw(uint amt)
{
uint withdrawAmount = amt;
uint newBalance = accountDeposit[msg.sender] -
withdrawAmount;
accountBalance[msg.sender] = newBalance;
}
function recoverAddr(bytes32 msgHash, uint8 v, bytes32 r,
bytes32 s) returns (address) {
return ecrecover(msgHash, v, r, s);
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}function isSigned(address _addr, bytes32 msgHash, uint8 v,
bytes32 r, bytes32 s) returns (bool) {
return ecrecover(msgHash, v, r, s) == _addr;
}
function strConcat(string a, string b) internal returns
(string){
bytes memory ba = bytes(a);
bytes memory bb = bytes(b);
string memory ret = new string(ba.length + bb.length);
bytes memory bret = bytes(ret);
uint k = 0;
for (uint i = 0; i < ba.length; i++)bret[k++] = ba[i];
for (uint j = 0; j < bb.length; j++) bret[k++] = bb[j];
return string(bret);
}
}
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